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The Government of the Hepublic willuot to1era te a uy dPpH t'(HI'•! 
frmn the principles flowing from neutrality . 
PoRT-AU-PRINCE, October 3, 1914~ 
ITALY. 
WAR DECLARATIONS. 
Declaration of war aga-inst Atlstria-Hungary, .Jlay 23, 1915.1 
[2nd Austro-Hungarian Red Book.] 
No. 204.-Baron Burian to "Baron Macchio. 
[Telegram.] 
VIENNA, JJJay 23, 1915. 
The Duke of A varna this afternoon handed to 1ne the follow-
ing declaration of war : 
[Translation from the French.] 
In cmnpliance with the orders of his noble SoYereign the IGng, 
the undersigned Royal Italian ambassador has the honor to coln-
hl.lmicate the following to his excellency the Austro-Hungariau 
minister of foreign affairs : 
On the 4th of this month the Austro-Hungarian Govern1nent 
was informed of the grave reasons for which Italy, confident of 
being in the right, declared that her alli~nce \vith Austria-
ETungary was null and void, and without effect in future, since 
this alliance had been violated by the Austro-IIungarian Govern-
ment, and that Italy resumed her full freedom of action. Fully 
determined to protect Italian rights and interes_ts \vith all .:the 
means at its disposal, the ·Italian Government can not evade its 
duty to take such measures as events may impose upon it against 
all present and future menaces to the fulfillment of Italy's na-
tional aspirations. His Majesty the King declares that from to-
morrow he will consider himself in a state of war with Austria-
flungary. 
The undersigned has the honor at the same time to inform his-
excellency the minister of foreign affairs that to-day the Austro-
Hungarian ambassador in Rome will receive his passports, and he 
\vould be grateful if his execellency would hand him likewise his 
own passports. 
1 San Marino is reported to have declared war upon Austria-Hungary 
June 3, 1915. (American Year Book, 1915, p. 813; Am. Jour. Int. Law,. 
9: 27.) 
1 G-± I tali an l\l otification, 1915. 
Notification of war with A.ustria-Hungary, ]!Jay 23, 1915.1 
ritalian Green Book.] 
No. 77, Annex 2.-Note of Baron Sonnino, Italian Foreign Minister. 
[Communicated to Italian representatives abroad and _to foreign Govern· 
ments -on May 23, 1915.] 
· ROME, 1liay 23, 1915. 
A clear proof of the e1ninently con~rvative and defensive cbar-
u.cter of the triple alliance is to be found in the letter and spirit of 
the treaty, anLl in the policy clearly n1an~fested and confirmed by 
the official acts of the ministers who created the alliance and who 
·were respqnsible for its renewals. 
' Italian policy has ever been inspired -vvith the idears of peace. 
Austria-Hungary, in provoking a European war, in refusing to 
accept Serbia's reply ·which gave Austria-Hungary all the satis-
facti_on whic11 she could legitimately demand, in refusing to listen 
to the conciliatory proposals which Italy had made in conjunction 
with other powers in order to preserve Europe from an immense 
conflict, which would drench it in blood and pile up ruins on a 
scale hitherto unknown and undrean1ed of-Austria-Hungary tore 
up with her own hands the treaty of alliance -vvitlt Italy, which; 
so long as it was loyally interpreted other than as an instrument 
of -aggression against others, had been a valuable factor in 
eliminating and settling disputes, and in securing for 1nany years 
to cmne the inestilnable benefits of peace. 
The first article of the treaty reafiinned the logical and general 
principle of every treaty of alliance, na1nely, the obligation to 
exchange views on political· and econo1nic questions of a general 
nature -vvhich Inight arise. It followed that neither contracting 
party \\'as at liberty to undertake, without previous 1nutual agree-
ment, action by which the other contracting parties might incur 
any obligation under the treaty of alliance, and in any way affect 
their n1ost ilnportant interests. Austria-Hungary, by sending 
her note of July 23, 1914, to Serbia without previously consulting 
Italy failed in this duty; Austria-Hungary thus violated unques-
tionably one of -the funda1nental clauses of the treaty. Austria-
Hungary was all the 1nore under the obligation to consult Italy 
first, inas1nuch as her uncompromising action against Serbia had 
created a situation directly tending to provoke a European war, 
and as early as the .beginning o:E July, 1914, the Royal Govern-
ment, who were anxious in regard to the way things were shaping ,. ' 
at Vienna, had repeatedly counseled 1noderation, and had warned 
the Imperial and Royal Government of the possible danger of a 
general European crisis. 
1 See also Journal Officiel, May 27, 1915, p. 3335. 
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The _action taken by Austria-Hungary against Serbia was, more-
oYer, directly in opposition to Italian general political and eco-
nomic interests in the Balkan Peninsula. It is not possible that 
Austria could have thought that Italy would remain indifferent to 
any din1inution of Serbian independence. Our warnings had not 
been lacking on this point. For many years Italy had frmn time 
to tilne warned Austria, in friendly but unequivocal terms, that 
she considered the independence of Serbia an essential factor in 
the balance of power in the Balkans, which Italy herself could 
never allo\v to be disturbed to her detriment. And this spirit was 
not' only expressed in the private conversations of her diplomats, 
but her states1nen proclailned it loudly and publicly in her Parlia-
ment. 
'Vhen, in delivering an ultimatum to Serbia, Austria not only 
failed-in defiance of all custom-to consult us beforehand, but 
used every effort to conceal it from us, so that we only heard of 
it simultaneously with the public through the telegraphic agencies 
before we were informed diplomatically, she not only placed her-
self outside the alliance with Italy but showed herself an enemy 
of Italian interests. 
It became clear to the Royal Government, frorri trustworthy 
information in their possession, that the whole trend of Austro-
Hungarian action in the Balkans would lead to a very serious 
impairment' of the political and economic position of Italy, be-
cause it airned directly or indirectly at the subjugation of Serbia, 
the political and territorial isolation of 1\1ontenegro, and the-
isolatiun of Rumania and the diminution of her political im-
portance. This impairment of Italy's position in the Balkans 
would have been brought about even if Austria-Hungary had had 
no idea of territorial aggrandizement. It is sufficient to remark 
that the Austro-Hungarian Government were under an express 
obligation to take Italy into consultation by virtue of a special 
article of the treaty of the triple alliance, which established the 
bond of a defensive agreement and the right to cmnpensa tion 
among the allies in the case of the temporary or permanent 
occupation of any part of the Balkans. The Royal Govern1nent 
besan conversations on. the subject \Vith the Imperial and Royal 
Gov1~rnment· immediately at 'the beginning of hostile action by 
Austria-Hungary ag~.inst Serbia, receiving, after smne reluctance, 
an adhesion in principle. 
Those conversations were begun immediately after July 23, 
with a view to giving to the treaty, which had been violated and 
therefore annulled by the~ action of Austria-Hungary, a new ele-
ment of life, which could only be effected by the conclusion of 
ne\V agreements. 
Conversations were. reopened on a rather more definite basis 
in the month of December, 1914. The royal ambassador at 
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Vienna then received instructions to infonn Count Berchtold that 
the Italian Governn1ent considered it necessary to proceed with-
out any delay to an exchange of ideas, with a view to negotiating 
-with the Governn1ent on concrete points in order to clear up the 
\vhole situation arising out of the conflict provoked by Austria-
Hungary. Count Berchtold refused at first, on the. ground that 
he did not think it was necessary, in the present circumstances, 
to enter into negotiations. But in consequence of our reply, with 
·which the Ger1nan Government associated themselves, Count 
Berchtold subsequently informed us that he was ready to enter 
into the exchange of ideas which we had proposed. 
We accordingly immediately set out the fundamental broad 
lines of our point of view, that is to say, we declared that the 
c9mpensation that vve had in n1ind as affording the basis of a . 
possible agreement 1nust envisage territories now under the domi-
nation of Austria-Hungary. 
The discussions continued from 1nonth to month from the be-
ginnjng of December until March, and it was not until the end 
of Mar~h that Baron Burian made us an offer of a zone of ter-
ritory extending slightly to the north of the town of Trent. In 
return for this cession Austria-Hungary demanded from. us in 
her turn numerous reciprocal engagements, including full and 
complete freedotn of action in the Balkans. 
It should be noted that the Austro-Hungarian Govern1nent did 
not contemplate that the cession of territory in the Trentino 
should ·be effected hnmediately, as we had de1nanded, but only at 
the end of the present war. vVe replied that we could not J?Ossibly 
accept the offer, and we forn1ulated the minimum concessions 
that would be in any way consistent both with our national as-
pirations and with the improvement of our strategical position on 
the Adriatic. Such require1nents included a smnewhat larger dis-
trict of the Trentino, a new district on . the Isonzo, the special 
treatlnent of Trieste, the cession of so1ne islands of the Curzolari 
Archipelago, a declaration of Austria's disinterestedness in Alba-
nia, and the recognition of our possession of Valona and the Dod· 
ekanese. 
All our requests 1net at first with ~ categorical refusal. It was 
only after another 1nonth of conversations that Austria-Hungary 
\vas ind ucecl to increase the zone of terri tory to be ceded in the 
Trentino, setting the lilnit at Mezzolombardo, but excluding 
Italian districts, as, for instance, the whole side of the Valley of 
Noce, the Val di Fassa, and the Val di Ampizzo, and leaving us 
a boundary \Vhich clid not correspond in any way to strategical 
require1nents. Moreover, the Austrian Government firmly ad-
hered to their refusal to 1nake any cession effective before the 
end of the \var. The repeated refusals of Austria-Hungary were 
explicitly confir1ned in a conversation between Baron Burian and 
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the royal an1bassa<1or at Vienna on April 29 last, the upshot of 
which was that the Austro-Hungarian Govern1nent, while admit-
ting the possibility of recognizing to a certain extent our prepon-
derant interest at Valona and the aforesaid cession of territory 
in the Trentino, persisted in giving a negative reply to almost all 
our other demands, and especially to those regarding the line of 
the Isonzo, Trieste, and the islands. 
Frmn the attitude adopted by Austria-Hungary from the begin-
ning of December to the end of April it became quite clear that· 
she "·as merely trying to temporize without achieving any definite 
results. In these circu1nstances Italy found herself face to face 
with the danger that all her aspirations, whether traditional or 
ethnical, and her desire for security on the Adriatic, would be 
lost forever, while on· the other hand the European war menaced 
her· highest interests in other seas. 
Owing to this fact it became at once a duty and a necessity for 
Italy to recover the liberty of action which \vas her right, and to 
seek to preserve her interests by other 1neans than those e1nployed 
in the negotiations fruitlessly pursued for five months; and by 
other means than through the treaty of alliance, which by the 
action of Austria-Hungary had virtually been at an end since 
.July, i914. 
It will not be inappropriate to observe that once the alliance 
had come to an end there was no longer any reason for the 
Italian people to maintain the attitude of acquiescence which had 
been dictated by their sincere desire for peace nor to repress any 
longer-as they had so long forced themselves to do~the indig-
nation caused by the treatment to which the Italian population in 
Austria was subjected. It is true the treaty contained no formal 
provision for safeguarding the Italian language, traditions, or 
civilization in the regions inhabited by our compatriots in Austria-
Hungary. 
But ·since it "·as sought to give to the alliance an appearance ·Of 
sincere peace and harmony, it is obvious that there was a moral 
obligation on the part of our ally to pay strict regard to and 
sc-rupulously to respect the vital interests involved for us in the 
Tacial distribution on the Adriatic coast. 
As a matter of fact, the constant policy of the Austro-Hungarian 
Government aimed for many years at the destruction of Italian 
nationality and civilization along the coast of the Adriatic. It 
will only be necessary to give a few short instances of facts and 
tendencies already too well known to everyone; systematic substi-
tution for officials of Italian nationality of officials of other nation-
alities; the importation of hundreds of. families of different na-
tionality; the creation at Trieste of cooperative societies of foreign 
workmen; the Hohenlohe decrees which aimed at excluding all 
Italian officials from the public life of Trieste; the denationaliza-
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tion of the judicial administration; the question ·of the university t' 
whch formed t]1e subject of diplomatic negotiations; the denation-
alization of the steamship companies; the action of the police and 
political trials tending to favor other nationalities at the expe'nse· .. 
of the I-talians; the systematic expulsion of Italians, wholly unjus-
tified and constantly increasing in number. 
The unchanging policy of the Imperial and Royal Government 
toward the subject Italian population was not solely inspired by 
internal motives due to the existence of contending nationalities 
within the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, but appears, on the con-
trary, to have been caused in great part by a deep~rooted sentiment 
of hostility and aversion for Italy, which prevails in certain circles. 
which are in close touch vvith the Austro-Hungarian Government, 
and which have a dominating influence on its decisions. li~rmn 
among many proofs of this which could be cited, it may suffice to· 
mention that in1911, while Italy was engaged in war with Turkey, 
the general staff at Vienna made preparations that grew more· 
and more -obvious for an attack upon us, and the military party 
made most active attempts to win over to its views the other fac-
tors responsible for the action of the monarchy. 
At the same time the anned preparations on our frontier as-
suined an openly offensive character. The crisis came to a pacific 
solution, as far as can be judged, owing to the influence of exter-
nal factors. But from that tirne onward we have ·remained under' 
the ilnpression that we might unexpectedly find ourselves exposed 
to armed menace \vhenever the party hostile to us might obtain 
predominance at Vienna. All this was knovvn to Italy, but (as 
has been said before) a sincere desire for peace prevailed among 
the Italian people. 
When new conditions caine into existence_ Italy tried to see 
whether, even under such circumstances, it might be possible to 
find a more solid basis and a 1nore durable guarantee for her 
treaty vvith Austria-Hungary. But her endeavors, conducted over 
a p~riod of many months in constant accord with Germany, ·who 
agreed that negotiation ·was legitimate, were spent in vain. Hence 
Italy has found herself forced by the course of events to seek 
other solutions, and since the treaty of alliance with Austria-
Hungary had already virtually ceased to exist, and no\V only 
served to cloak the real situation-one of continual suspicions 
and daily differences-the royal ambassador at Vienna was in-
structed to declare to the Austro-Hungarian Government that the 
Italian Government considered itself freed fro1n any binding 
power of the treaty of triple alliance as far as Austria-Hungary 
was concerned. This con1munication \vas made at Vienna on 
l\iay 4. 
After this declaration on our. part, and after vve had been forced 
to proceed to the legitimate protection of our o\vn interests, the 
lVotification oJ War ~with 7'wrlcey. 1()!) 
Imperial and Royal Government made new offers of inadequate 
concessions, which in no sense· corresponded to the 1ninimun1 de-
mands of our former proposals. These offers could in no wise be 
accepted by us. The Royal Government, considering all that has 
been set forth above, strengthened by the votes of Parliament and 
by the solemn n1anifestations of the nation, has resolved to make 
an end of delays, and on this day has declared to the Austro-
Hungarian ambassador at Rome, in the name of the I\::ing, that 
Italy considers herself in a state of war with Austria-Hungary 
fro1n to-morrow, l\1ay 24. Instructions in the same sense were 
telegraphed yesterday to the royal ambassado1~ at Vienna. 
SoNNINo. 
Notification of war with Turkey, noon, Augttst 21, 1915.1 
File No. 763.72/2052. 
The italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State of the United States.· 
[Translation.] 
No. 2651.] ITALIAN EMBASSY, 
Beverly Fanns, J.l!ass., August 21, 1.915. 
l\Ir. SECRETARY oF STATE: I have the honor by order of n1y GoY-
erninent to bring the following to your excellency's knowledge. 
Fr01n the elate of the signature of the treaty of peace of 
Lausanne, on October 18, 191_2, the Ottoman Govenunent has been 
violating that treaty and the violations have not ceased for an 
instant until now. 
As a 1natter of fact the Imperial Governn1ent never adopted 
in earnest any n1easure to bring about the immediate cessation 
of hostilities in Lybia, as it was bound to do u.nder its covenants 
sole1nnly entered into; and it did nothing toward the release 
of the Italian prisoners of war. The Ott01nan soldiers re1naining 
in Tripoli and Cyrenaica were kept there under co1n1nand of· their 
own· officers, continuing to use the Ottoman flag, holding pos-
session of their rifles and cannons. Enver Bey continued to 
direct in person the hostilities against the Italian Army until the 
end of November, 1912, and Aziz Bey did not leave those parts 
with 800 men of the regular forces until June, 1913; 'rhe way in 
Yvhich both these com1nanders were received on their return to 
Turkey is proof evident that their acts were fully assented to 
by the imperial authorities. After Aziz Bey's departure, on the 
other hand, officers of the Turkish Army continued to find their 
1 " The Royal Italian ambassador at Paris made known on the 29th 
August, 1915, that the Royal Italian Government declared war on Tur-
key on the date of Aug. 20, 1915, at 12 o'clock noon." (Journ. OII., Aug. 
31' 1915, p. 6107.) 
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way into C;yrenaica. On this very <lay there are nwre than a 
hunc1rec1 there whose na1nes are known to the Italian Govepunent. 
In April last 35 young men frmn Benghazi. whmn Enver Bey had 
taken to Constantinople against the will of the Royal Govern-
Inent and who \Vere -there achnitted into the 1nilitary acaden1y 
\Yere sent back to Cyrenaica ·without our knowledge. Again the 
K:ing's Govern1nent positively knovvs, any declaration to the con-
trary notwithstanding, . that the holy war was also proclaimed 
against the Italians in Africa in 1914. And a mission of Turkish 
officers and soldiers bearing gifts to the Senussi chiefs in rebel-
lion against the Italian authorities in Lybia were recently cap-
tured by French warships. 
The relations of peace and friendship which the Italian Gov-
ernn1ent thought it could establish with the Otto1nan Govern-
Inent after the treaty of Lausanne therefore never existed, through 
the latter's fault. And after every diplon1atic representation 
against violations of the'treaty had proved utterly useless there 
remained nothing for the Royal Government to do but to provide 
otherwise for the safeguard of the high interests of the State and 
the defense of its colonies against the pers~stent 1nenace and the 
actual acts of hostility on the part of the o·ttoman Government. 
It beca1ne all the more necessary and urgent to reach a decision, 
as the. Ottoman Government quite recently committed patent in-
vasions of the rights, "interests, and very freedom of Italian citi-
zens in the Empire, the more energetic protests entered on this 
point by the King's ambassador at Constantinople being of no 
avail. In the presence of the tergiversations of the Ottoman 
Govenunent on the specific point of letting Italian citizens freely 
depart from Asia Minor, these protests had, in these last few 
days, to assume the for_m of an ultilnatum. · On the 3d. of the 
1nonth the royal . ambassador at Constantinople addressed by 
order of the Royal Government a note to the Grand Vizier set-
ting forth the following four demands : 
1. -That the Italians be free to leave Beirut. 
2. That the Italiaps in Smyrna, the port of Vourla being un-
available, be allovved to leave by way of Sigadjik. 
3. That the Ottoman Govern1nent let Italians embark unmo-
lested frmn Mersina, Alexandretta, Cai-ffa, and Jaffa. 
4. That the local authorities in the interior stop opposing the 
departure of ·royal subjects proceeding to the coast, and, on the 
contrary, endeavor to facilitate their journey. 
On 'the 5th of August, before the expiration of the term of 48 
hours set in the Royal Government's ultimatum, the Otto1nan 
Governn1ent, in a note signed by the Grand Vizier, accepted every 
point in the Italian demands. On the strength of such solemn 
dec1 ara tions the I(ing's Government arranged to send two ships 
to llhodes with instructions to await orders t~ proceed and take 
LVotification of 1V,ar with GerJn,any, Aug .138, 1916. 171 
on board the Italian citizens, who for som~ thne had been stayill.g 
in the above-named ports of Asia l\linor, until they could return 
home. But now it appears frmn reports of the American consular 
officers whom the United States GoYernment has graciously au-
thorized to assume the protection of Italian interests at various 
posts that the Turldsh 1nilitary authority at Beirut canceled on 
the 9th instant the pennit to leave granted but a short time 
before. It was likewise canceled at l\lersina. It was further 
announced that the Ottoman 1nilitary authorities had opposed 
the e1nbarkation of other Italians residing in Syria. 
In the presence of this patent breach of categorial promises 
made by the Ottoman Governn1ent in consequence of the Italian 
GoYernment's ultinulttup the Royal GoYenunent has issued in-
structions to His l\Iajesty's mnbassador at Constantinople to de-
liver a declaration of war on Turkey. And the declaration of 
\Var was delivered this day at Constantinople to the Ottoman Gov-
ernment by the I{:ing's a1nbassador. 
Accept, etc., 
v. MACCHI DI CELLERE. 
Notification of a state of war with Bulgaria, October 19, 1915. 
[Rev. Gen., Doc. 23: 150.] 
Bulgaria having opened hostilities against Serbia in allying 
itself with the enemies of Italy and in combating the allies, the 
Italian Government has, by order of the I\:ing, declared that a 
state of war exists between Italy and Bulgaria, October 19, 1915. 
Notification of war with Gennany, August 28, 19i6.1 
The Italian Ambassador to the Secretary of State of the United States. 
[Translation.] 
ROYAL ITALIAN EMBASSY, _ 
Beverly Fanns, August 28, 1916. 
Mr. SECRETARY oF STATE: I have the honor to address the fol-
lowing communication to your excellency in the name of the 
King's Government: 
Systematically hostile acts on the part of the German Govern-
ment to the detriment of Italy have succeeded one another ·with 
increasing frequency, consisting in both an actual ·warlike par-
ticipation and economic measures of every kind. 
'Vith regard to the for1ner, it will suffice to 1nention the -reit-
erated supplies of arms and of instnunents of war, terrestrial 
1 See also Journal Officiel , Aug. 31, 1916, p. 7831. 
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and 1naritirne, furnished by Germany to Austria-Hungary, . antl 
the uninterrupted pa:r;ticipation of German officers, soldiers, and 
seamen in the various operations of \Var directed against Italy.1 
In fact, it is only thanks to the assistance afforded her by Ger-
rnany in the most varied forms that Austria-Hungary has recently 
been able to concentrate her most extensive effort against Italy. 
It is also worth while to recall the transmission, by the German 
Government to Austria-Hungary, of the Italian prisoners who 
had escaped frmn the Austro-Hungarian concentration carnps and 
taken refuge in German territory. 
Arnong the measures of an econmnic character ·which were 
hostile to Italy it ·will be sufficient to cite the invitation \Vhich, at 
the· instance of the imperial department of· foreign affairs, wa~ 
directed to Gennan credit institutions and bankers to consider 
every Italian citizen as a hostile foreigner and to suspend pay-
n1ents due him; also the suspension of payment to Italian laborers 
of the pensions clue them by virtue of the formal provisions of 
the German law. 
The Governrnent ·of His Majesty the l{ing did not think that 
it could longer tolerate such a state of things, which aggravates, 
to the exclusive detriment of Italy, the sharp contrast between 
the "'de facto and the de jure situation alrea.dy arising from the 
fact of the alliance of Italy and of Germany with two groups of 
nations at war among one another. 
For these reasons the Royal Government has, in the name of 
his.lVIajesty the l{ing, notified the German Government through 
the Swiss Government that, as from to-day, August 28, Italy 
considers herself in a state of war \Vith Germany. 
Please accept, etc., 
MACCHI DI CELLERE . 
• 
BLOCKADES AND NAVIGATION RESTRICTIONS. 
Notification of declaration of blockade of Austria-Hungary and 
Albania, 111cly 26, 1915.2 
tJ·ournal Officiel, June 3, 1915, p. 3549.] 
The Royal Italian Government, in view of the state of war 
existing between Italy and Austria-Hungary, considering that the 
1 In an opinion of the German Reichsgericht .at Leipsic, shortly before 
the war, appears the statement: "Formally there is not a state of war 
between Germany and Italy, but it must be admitted nevertheless that 
Germany participates in the Austro-Italian War in consequence of the 
treaties existing between Austria· and Germany. According to these 
treaties, in case Austria is obliged to send troops to other theaters of 
the war, Germany should fill the vacancies thus caused by means of 
proper forces." (Journal du droit international p.rive. (Clunet), 43: 
1701.) . 
2 " A dispatch from Vienna says that Austria-Hungary sent on June 9, 
1H15, to foreign powers a note protesting against the blockade of Albania 
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Austro-Hungarian naval authorities 1nake use of some ports of 
the Albanian coast for clandestinely supplying their navy, declare 
that, starting fr01n l\1ay 26 : 
1. The Austro-Hungarian coast, extending from the Italian fron-
tier at the north to the l\fontenegrin frontier at the south, \Vith all 
it'-; ports, isles, harbors, roadsteads, creeks; 
2. The coast of Albania, extending from the Montenegrin fron-
tier at the north to and including Cape Kiephali 1 at the south 
will be held in a state of effective blockade by the Italian naval 
forces. 
The geographical lilnits of the blockaded territory will be the 
following: 
For the Austro-Hungarian coast: Northern limit, 45° 42' 50" 
north latit-ude and 13° 15' 10" east longitude (Greenwich) ; 
southern limit, 42°- 6' 25;' north latitude and 19° 5' 30" east longi-
tude (Greenwich). 
Vessels of friendly or neutral powers \Viii have a time, which 
will be fixed by the commander in chief of the Italian naval forces, • 
after the date of the declaration of blockade to freely leave the 
blockaded zone. 
All vessels which, in violation of blockade, atte1npt to cross or 
have crossed the barred line, established between the Cape of 
Otrante and the Cape of Kiephali will be proceeqed against ac-
cording to the rules of international la\Y and to treaties in force. 
Notification of declaration of blockade of Albania, ]Jay 30, 1915. 
[Rev. Gen., Doc. 22: 215. See also London Gazette, June 4, 1915, 
p. 5386.] 
The Royal Government declares that the blockade of the coast 
of Albania which, by the declaration of l\1ar 26~ \Vas established 
from ~fontenegro at the north to Ca11e I\::iephali at the south is 
by Italy and declaring that this blockade is contrary to· the sovereign 
rights of a State whose neutrality Italy expressly recognized at the con-
ference of ambassadors at London in 1913. The blockade is also con-
trary to the first article of the Declaration of London of Feb. 26, 1909, 
since the Austrian Army and Navy do not occupy a part of Albania, 
nor do they use the Albanian ports as bases of supply _for the Austrian 
Navy. Finally, the blockade is not valid because it is contrary to the 
Declaration of London that the Austro-Hungarian local authorities have 
not received notification of the blockade." (London, June 12, H.l15, 
Clunet, 42 : 266.) 
1 "The blockade of the coast of Albania by Italy, south to the Cape 
of Kiephali, has been considered, in the midst of Greek politics, as being 
the result of an error. In effect it would result that all the coast of 
Chimara, which was made part of the Epire if the north, actually 
occupied by Greece with the assent of the powers, would be blockaded. 
The territory to the north of Epire enjoyed, by the very faCt of its 
occupation by Greek troops, the same r.eutrality as the Hellenic king-
dolJI nnd can not consequently be submitted to 1 any blockade." (Temps, 
).Jay 30, 19J 5; Rev. Gen., Doc. 22 :215.) See following text. 
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reduced frmn the 30th ::\lay, fron1 the sa1ne (northern limits) to 
Aspri R uga. 
Consequently the geographic lilnits of the blockade of Alba11 ian 
t erritory are the folloydng : Northern limit, 41 o 52' north lati-
tude- and 19° 22' 40" east longitude (Greenwich) ; southern lhnit, 
40° 9' 36" north latitude, 19° 35' 45" east longitude (Greenwich). 
rrhe new barred line, established between the Cape of Otrante and 
Aspri Ruga will form the line of blockade, with all the effects of 
the declaration of lVlay 26, 1915. 
The period conceded to vessels of friendly and neutral powers 
to leave the blockade zone has been fixed by the commander in· 
chief of the Italian. naval forces at 10 days from the date of the 
declaration of blockade. 
Notification relating to n aviga tion of the . Strait of Messina, },fay 
30, 191'5. 
[Journal Officiel, Jun~ ~' 1915, p. 3518.] 
Navigation in the Strait of Messina is forbidden three-quarters 
of an hour after sunset until a half hour before sunrise .. 
Navigation is permitted in the day in clear weather; under 
r eservation of the prescriptions in force in reference to war ves-
sels, torpedo boats, and sub1narines of the national or allied navies, 
it is ordered that all national, allied, and neutral merchant vessels 
await authorization before navigating the strait, vessels coming · 
fro1n the north to stop on the 1neridian of Forte-Apuria, at least 
3 miles away, and to exchange signals ·with the semaphore; those 
coming from the south to stop on the 1neridian of Cape Dell Armi 
and to observe the same prescriptions. 
Notification, blockade of the Adriatic, July 6, 191-ti. 
[London Gazette, July 23, 1915, p. 7190; Journal Officiel, Julv .17, 1915, 
p. 4857.] 
The secretary of state for foreign affairs has received from His 
Majesty's a.mbassador at Rome the following translation of a 
Royal decree, dated July 4, and published in the Italian Official 
Gazette of the 8th : 
ARTICLE 1. The blockade declared by the Royal Government on 
the 26th and 30th May, is extended to the whole zone of the 
Adriatic Sea to the north of the Otrante-Aspri-Ruga ( Strade 
Bianchi) line. 
Consequently, the navigation in the Adriatic Sea to the north 
of this line by merchant ships of any nationality is forbidden. 
ART. 2. The minister of marine or authorities delegated by him 
may, nevertheless, grant after necessary inquiries, special safe 
conduct to merchant ships desirous of proceeding to ports belong. 
ing to or occupied by Italy or Montenegro. 
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Vessel':; desirous of entering the Adriatic must proceed to Ga lli-
poli (Apulia), where the safe conducts of enti·y must be ohtained. 
For leaving the Adriatic, vessels after having r eceive<l pel'mi s-
sion at the port of departure 1nust proceed to Bari, wher e they 
·will be furni shed with the safe conducts of departure. 
Yessels provided with safe conducts 1nust cross the blockade 
line, Otrante-Aspri-Ruga ( Str~de Bianchi) during daytime only. 
They must stop on that line at a distance not greater than 5 
miles from the Italian shore, •to be visited by the men of war 
destined for that purpose. 
ART. 3. The rules laid down in our decree of June 13, 1915, No. 
899, as well as any special regulations which the naval authori-
ties 1nay think fit to enforce on vessels entering or leaving the 
Adriatic, 1nust be observed by all n1erchant vessels of whatever 
nationality navigating in the Adriatic, in the circu1n~tances 
provided for in Article 2. 
ART. 4. Vessels contravening the rules laid down in tlle preced-
ing articles ··will be considered guilty of violation of blockade/ and 
are liable to capture and confiscation, together with their cargo, 
according to the regulations in force. 
ART. 5. The present decree will c6me into force on July 6, 1915. 
JAPAN. 
Ulti1natunt to Gcnnany, A~tgust 15, 191.1. 
[Official Japanese Documents; See also Austro-Hungarian Red Bool• 
No. 66.] 
No. 3.-Telegram dispatched by the Imperial Japanese Government to the-
charge d'affaires ad interim at Berlin on August 15, 1914. 
You are hereby instructed to address to Herr von Jago·w inune-
diately on receipt of this telegran1 a signed note to the following 
effect: 
The undersigned, charge d'affaires ad interiln of His Majesty 
the Emperor-of Japan, has the honor in pursuance of instructions . 
from hjs· Government to comn1unicate to his excellency, the Ininis-
t<:>r for foreign affairs of His l\Iajesty, the Genn'an E1nperor t o the. 
fo11o,ving effect: 
Considering it highly important and necessary in the present 
~ituation to take measures to remove all causes of disturbance to 
the pea ce of th~ Far East and to safeguard the general interests 
contemplated by the agreement of alliance between Japan and 
Great Britian in order to secure a fir1n and enduring peace in · 
c:1stern Asia, which is the aim of the said agreement, the llnperial 
Japanese Government sincerely believe it th~ir duty to give advice 
